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2 
Summary1 
In recent years a series of crises have hit the European Union (i.e., the Eurozone crisis, the 
sovereign debt crises, the Great Recession, the refugee crisis, Brexit). Such precarious times 
have challenged solidarity both between European citizens, as well as between the Member 
States of the EU. The current paper investigates the degree of European solidarity in the Euro-
pean Union in the light of these developments. 
The paper describes the preliminary findings of a recent research project conducted on Euro-
pean solidarity. We surveyed citizens of 13 Members States of the EU about their disposition 
toward (European) solidarity. An upcoming book will offer an elaborate theoretical framework 
about the existence of European solidarity. Additionally, this book will also presents detailed 
results from the project and in-depth discussion of the findings. However, we decided to publish 
some of the descriptive results beforehand in the form of this report as the major findings of 
our study have high public and political relevance. The development of recent crises has been 
rather fast-paced, and is in contrast with the long wait that comes with the publication of aca-
demic texts. So, the latter process hinders the most important information to reach the public 
and policy makers as soon as possible and this report wishes to remedy it slightly. 
In Chapter 1, we will elaborate on the conceptual framework of our study. By European soli-
darity, we understand a form of solidarity expanded beyond one’s own nation state; recipients 
of solidarity are other EU countries, or citizens living in another EU country. In the first part of 
Chapter 1, we systematically distinguish between four different domains of European solidar-
ity: (1) Fiscal solidarity, defined as citizens’ willingness to support indebted European countries 
financially. (2) Welfare state solidarity, defined as citizens’ strong agreement to support those 
in need – unemployed, sick, and the elderly – regardless of where they live in the EU, and to 
reduce inequality between rich and poor people in Europe. (3) Territorial solidarity, the will-
ingness to reduce inequality between poor and rich EU countries. (4) Finally, the refugee crisis 
has raised the question of (4.1) external solidarity, defined as the support for the EU to grant 
asylum to refugees coming from outside of EU, and (4.2) internal solidarity, defined as a strong 
                                            
1  This research has been the result of a cooperation of the research project SOLIDUS funded by the European 
Commission in the context of the Horizon 2020 research programme (Grant Agreement No. 649489), and the 
research unit Horizontal Europeanization funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) (FOR 1539). 
This report has been also published in the “Berlin Studies on the Sociology of Europe” (BSSE) working paper 
series (http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/soziologie/arbeitsbereiche/makrosoziologie/arbeitspapiere/bsse_37.html). 
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agreement with how Member States should share the burden of distributing refugees among 
themselves. In the second part of Chapter 1, we define different criteria for determining the 
strength of European solidarity. 
In Chapters 2 to 5, we will apply the explicated criteria for the existence of European solidarity 
to each of the four domains of solidarity. By doing so, we can determine the strength of Euro-
pean solidarity in each domain of solidarity. As this report aims at giving a first overview of 
some of our results, we will apply two of the four theoretically developed criteria of European 
solidarity to the four domains only and present the corresponding descriptive results. 
Overall, our analyses reveal some unanticipated findings. Europeans altogether display a nota-
bly higher level of solidarity with citizens of other EU countries and EU states than many pol-
iticians and social scientists have so far presumed. This especially applies to the support of 
people in need (welfare state solidarity) and the reduction of wealth inequalities between rich 
and poor European countries (territorial solidarity), but also to the domain of fiscal solidarity. 
On top of this, European solidarity turns out to be more established than the global one. 
However, this optimistic view is not valid for the domain of solidarity with refugees. Whilst 
citizens of western and southern European countries support both, the acceptance of refugees 
and the fair distribution of the incurring costs and burdens between European countries, the 
majority of people in eastern European countries do not share this point of view. 
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1  Theoretical Framework and Empirical Basis of our Study 
1.1 Four Domains of Solidarity 
The question “How strong is solidarity in the European Union” has become one of the most 
hotly debated topics among politicians and scholars during the last ten years. By European 
solidarity, we understand a form of solidarity that goes beyond one’s own nation state, and 
where the recipients of solidarity are other EU countries, or citizens of other EU countries. We 
distinguish between different domains of solidarity, each of the domains relate to one of the 
different crises the EU has had to face in the last ten years. 
The first crisis is the European banking and financial crisis, resulting from mass insolvencies 
in the American real estate market. The financial crisis subsequently jeopardised the stability 
and liquidity of several major European banks. To save banks teetering on the brink of bank-
ruptcy, some European Member States took out large government loans, which resulted in ad-
verse deficits in their national budgets. The mismatch between drastically increased govern-
ment debts and stagnating gross domestic product led to a devaluation of the (international) 
credit status of some European countries. Moreover, the sovereign debt crisis weakened the 
Euro currency as a whole and put the European Monetary Union (EMU) under pressure. The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Central Bank (ECB), and not least of all, the 
EU Member States provided a series of financial support measures to tackle these institutional 
deficits, measures which were subsumed under the term “bailouts”. The Eurozone crisis reveals 
the underlying and more general question of to what extent the European Union is a community 
of solidarity, in which crisis-ridden countries can expect help from the wealthier countries. We 
call the financial support of indebted Member States from other Member States fiscal solidarity. 
Second, we understand the ensuing economic crisis (also known as the Great Recession) as 
another distinct crisis that is a direct consequence of the sovereign debt crisis, which besieged 
some Member States. EU creditors set strict requirements: countries had to make extensive 
structural reforms as a condition of the bailout measures. While these policy actions meant to 
restore the sustainable growth of economies in the long-term, in some Member States these so-
called austerity measures, however, even fostered an economic downturn in the short-term. In 
this context, austerity measures have further worsened the situation, especially in the stricken 
Mediterranean Member States, where the welfare state was comparatively weak even before 
the crisis (e.g. Gelissen 2000). 
5 
The economic crisis involves two different domains of European solidarity. In particular, aus-
terity measures affected the most vulnerable groups in society, including the poor, the sick, the 
unemployed, and the elderly. In this context, the question of European welfare state solidarity 
became a relevant issue – a domain of solidarity that accounts for the support of people in need 
living within the territory of the European Union, regardless of to which EU Member State they 
belong. Additionally, the economic crisis increased inequalities between Member States of the 
EU. Reducing inequality and wealth differences between Member States was, and still is, a key 
objective of the European Union. We define people’s willingness to reduce inequality between 
poor and rich EU countries as territorial solidarity. 
Lastly, a third crisis hit European countries that emerged independently of the former two. The 
heavy surge of refugees arriving from war-torn regions in the Middle East, especially from 
Syria, constituted the beginning of the so-called refugee crisis that peaked in 2015 (European 
Migration Network 2016). Regarding the refugee crisis, we distinguish between two different 
aspects of European refugee solidarity: external and internal refugee solidarity. On the one 
hand, we explore to what extent European citizens are willing to accept refugees from third 
countries. On the other hand, we investigate whether Europeans support the idea that refugees 
should be fairly distributed between the Member States of the EU. 
In sum, we differentiate between four distinct domains of institutionalised European solidarity, 
behind each of which lies a particular sort of crisis, namely fiscal, welfare state, and territorial 
solidarity, as well as refugee solidarity. Regarding all four domains, we investigate the extent 
of solidarity among European citizens. 
1.2 Criteria to Determine the Existence of European Solidarity 
How can one determine whether European solidarity exists? Based on an earlier project (Ger-
hards & Lengfeld 2015), we have developed a multi-step concept of testing solidarity that will 
help us to determine the strength of European solidarity (Gerhards, Lengfeld, Ignácz, Kley & 
Priem forthcoming). The following criteria are significant for this. 
(1) Majority Support from the Population. One can only speak of the existence of European 
solidarity if a majority of Europe’s citizens accept this idea. The European Union is both a 
federation of states and a federal state on its own. Accordingly, European citizens have two 
roles in the constitution of the European Union: (1) as citizens of their home nation, and (2) as 
citizens of the European Union (Habermas 2011: 67). Thereby, it does not suffice if just the 
majority of all Europeans support the idea of European solidarity. The majority of citizens in 
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each individual Member State must favour the idea of solidarity as well. Only such a double 
majority can ensure that the population in individual Member States will not feel overruled or 
heteronomous to others. For each of the four domains of solidarity (fiscal, welfare state, terri-
torial, and refugee solidarity), we test whether such a double majority is empirically given. 
(2) European Solidarity in Relation to National and Global Solidarity. The strength of Euro-
pean solidarity can only be relationally determined in comparison to other territorial spaces. 
Here, the comparison with national solidarity is especially relevant, because historically the 
nation state has been the central institution of solidarity – and in many ways still is. Simultane-
ously, globalisation processes may have led to the fact that the entire world has become the 
frame of reference for solidarity. We thereby differentiate between three different territorial 
spaces of solidarity: (1) solidarity between citizens and regions of the same nation state, (2) 
solidarity between the citizens and states within the EU, and (3) solidarity with citizens and 
states outside of the EU. Empirically we determine the strength of European solidarity for each 
domain in relation to national and global solidarity. We thereby claim that an independent Eu-
ropean space of solidarity exists, when European solidarity is stronger than the global one. 
However, we do not expect European solidarity to be more prevalent than national solidarity. 
Pertaining to the long history and influence of the nation state, this would not only be unrealis-
tic, but theoretically implausible. Citizens are of course not just Europeans but at the same time, 
and more importantly, primarily, (still) citizens of their nation states. 
(3) The Resilience of European Solidarity. One of the weaknesses of traditional attitudinal re-
search is that it only reconstructs citizens’ attitudes and values, yet does not further investigate 
their preparedness to stand up for their values. Above all, one can expect a high degree of sup-
port for values, when these values are socially desirable. This is likely to be the case on the 
issue of solidarity, since the term “solidarity” has a positive connotation. Therefore, we check 
European solidarity’s capacity for withstanding social desirability by testing its resilience 
(Kuhn & Stoeckel 2014). For this, we have questioned people whether they would be prepared 
to pay more taxes in order to realise European solidarity. We examine the influence of the level 
of taxes on people’s preparedness for solidarity. 
(4) Cleavages between Supporters and Opponents of European Solidarity. The criteria defined 
so far are necessary, but not sufficient conditions to speak of the existence of European solidar-
ity. In addition, the social and cultural background of people who reject European solidarity is 
also relevant. Opponents of European solidarity can turn out to be a societal dynamite if they 
succeed to organise among themselves, to mobilise politically, and to carry their interests into 
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the political arena. We tie these considerations with theories of social and political cleavages 
(cf. Ferrera 2005; Kriesi et al. 2012; Grande & Kriesi 2015; Hutter, Grande & Kriesi 2016). 
The capacity for minorities to mobilise is more probable if the citizens rejecting European sol-
idarity display common social characteristics. In cases where specific attitudes coincide with 
structural and cultural characteristics of respondents, social cleavages are likely to emerge, and 
the probability of disaffected minorities turning into an influential political force and forming 
a political cleavage increases. Therefore, another condition has to be fulfilled in order to speak 
of European solidarity: Those who oppose European solidarity should not form the basis for 
strong cleavages. We distinguish between two types of cleavages: 
(4.1) Social Cleavages: We analyse the extent to which attitudes toward the different domains 
of solidarity can be explained through structural and cultural characteristics of the respondents 
and the countries in which they live. Most recent literature assumes that a new cleavage has 
emerged in the context of globalisation processes (Bornschier 2010; Kriesi et al. 2012; Grande 
& Kriesi 2015; Hutter, Grande & Kriesi 2016; Hooghe & Marks 2009, 2018; Börzel & Risse 
2018). On the one side, there are people considering globalisation and Europeanisation pro-
cesses to be a positive phenomenon and support the opening up of their nation state, who want 
to grant people from other countries the same rights, and who welcome migration and consider 
it to enrich their country. On the other side are individuals interpreting the opening up of their 
own nation state as a threat, who believe that citizens from their own country are entitled to 
more rights than people from other countries, who oppose the uptake of migrants, and who do 
not consider this as an enrichment but rather as a threat to their own culture. Onawa Lacewell 
und Wolfgang Merkel (2013) describe the first group as cosmopolitans and the second as com-
munitarians, whereas others speak of the latter group as nationalists. Both groups are not only 
characterised by different cultural orientations, but also by different socio-economic features. 
Whilst cosmopolitans generally possess higher education levels, better income, have better and 
more secure careers, and in addition are internationally more connected, the opposite charac-
teristics apply for communitarians (i.e., low education, unemployed or threatened with job loss, 
of a lower social class, and internationally less networked). 
We presume that the advocates of European solidarity are more likely to be cosmopolitans and 
will display similar cultural and socio-economic characteristics, whilst the opponents to Euro-
pean solidarity have features that are typical of communitarians.2 In the empirical chapters, we 
                                            
2  Juan Díez Medrano and colleagues (2017), for example, showed that cosmopolitan orientations are positively 
correlated with the approval of the establishment of EU bailout funds. 
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analyse whether a link between structural and cultural factors and attitudes toward European 
solidarity exist.3 
(4.2) Political Cleavages: Structurally and culturally determined opponents of European soli-
darity then become politically relevant when they no longer linger in their latency, but actively 
express their political preferences. One of the most important modes of expressing one’s polit-
ical preference is during (national) elections, because governments emerge as a result of elec-
tions In accordance, our survey extracts information on which party the respondent would pro-
spectively vote for in the next (national) election. This allows us to analyse whether the oppo-
nents of European solidarity have preferences for specific parties, and thereby transfer their 
objectives into the political arena. 
In Chapter 2 to 5, we will apply the explicated criteria to each of the four domains of solidarity. 
By doing so, we can determine the existence and strength of European solidarity for each do-
main of solidarity. As this report aims at giving a first basic overview of our results, we con-
centrate only on two of the four theoretically developed criteria of European solidarity. Hence, 
we will test whether (1) the majority of European citizens and the majority of citizens in each 
Member State (a double majority) supports European solidarity, and (2) whether an independent 
European space of solidarity exists, in the sense that European solidarity is stronger than global 
solidarity in each of the four domains. 
1.3 The Transnational European Solidarity Study (TESS)4 
Our findings are based on a comparative survey. The “Transnational European Solidarity 
Study” (TESS) was conducted using computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI) in 13 Eu-
ropean countries in the summer and autumn of 2016. Respondents in the survey are citizens 
eligible to vote in national elections in the respective country. The final sample consists of 
                                            
3  The admission of refugees, for example, can lead to an increase in competition in a country’s labour market, 
especially for low-qualified, domestic workers. If refugees are interpreted as a threat to the socio-economic 
status of certain individuals, then the probability rises that these citizens will advocate the dominance of their 
nation state and speak out against solidarity with refugees. We thereby assume that an individual’s unemploy-
ment, and also a country’s unemployment rate has a negative influence on attitudes of solidarity. 
4  There exists another survey which partially overlaps with our study and which is part of a large project headed 
by Maurizio Ferrera entitled “Reconciling Economic and Social Europe: The Role of Values, Ideas and Poli-
tics” (REScEU). The survey covers seven EU countries (Ferrera, Pellegata & Ricci 2017). In this report, we 
will focus only on the presentation of the results of our study and will not compare the results with those of 
other studies. 
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12,500 respondents with approximately 1,000 respondents per country, including Austria, Cy-
prus, Germany, Greece, France, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Spain, and Sweden. For Cyprus, 500 interviews were sufficient due to its scarce population. 
TESS is part of a joint venture between two research groups: (1) the international research 
project Solidarity in Europe: Empowerment, Social Justice and Citizenship – SOLIDUS funded 
by the European Commission in the context of the Horizon 2020 research programme (Grant 
Agreement No. 649489), (2) and the research unit Horizontal Europeanization funded by the 
German Research Foundation (DFG) (FOR 1539). A sub-team of SOLIDUS from the Univer-
sity of Leipzig as well as from the Freie Universität Berlin from the DFG group were responsi-
ble for developing, monitoring, and analysing the TESS. The commercial opinion poll company 
TNS Opinion and Social carried out the fieldwork in all countries in the investigation. 
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2 European Fiscal Solidarity 
With the European sovereign debt crisis, the European Union experienced one of the worst 
crises since its inception. The 2008 financial crisis that emerged in the US spilled over to Eu-
ropean economies, and national governments had to stabilise their banks, which were threat-
ened by massive loan defaults. Additionally, the economies experienced an economic recession 
starting in 2009. Both crises destabilised national budgets especially in the southern Member 
States, leading to the sovereign debt crisis and posing a threat to the Euro. In order to bolster 
the single currency, the EU, its Member States, and the IMF implemented financial measures 
by granting guarantees and loans to Eurozone countries facing serious financial difficulties, 
such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Cyprus. A permanent, highly capitalised bailout for fu-
ture crisis situations was established in the form of the temporary European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF), followed by the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM). At the same 
time, the European Central Bank (ECB) purchased government bonds to support crisis coun-
tries. Ultimately, the Eurozone countries made a commitment to reciprocal, albeit limited, fi-
nancial aid to balance national budgets. 
In the TESS survey, we raised the question of whether EU citizens are willing to show fiscal 
solidarity with Member States facing serious economic hardship. To answer this question, we 
followed our theoretical concept by measuring attitudes toward fiscal solidarity on three spatial 
levels: between regions within an EU Member State, between EU Member States, and between 
EU Member States and countries outside the EU.5 
As Figure 2.1 shows, two thirds of all respondents agree with their country providing financial 
aid to EU countries. Hence, the first criterion for the existence of European solidarity is met. 
This holds also true for the second criterion: Fiscal solidarity with countries outside of the EU 
is significantly lower than fiscal solidarity with EU countries and the support is not shared by 
a majority of respondents. These results show that most respondents see the EU as an exclusive 
solidarity space that is distinct from the cosmopolitan idea of universal solidarity. Finally, re-
sults demonstrate that the nation state remains the dominant social space for supporting areas 
                                            
5  Wording of question (Q11) was the following: “We have learned in recent years that regions within countries 
as well as entire countries can fall into a severe debt crisis. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree 
with each of the following statements.” Q11A: “In times of crisis, the better off [GENERALREGIONNAME]s 
in [COUNTRY] should give financial help to other [GENERALREGIONNAME]s facing severe economic 
difficulties.” Q11B: “In times of crisis, [COUNTRY] should give financial help to other EU countries facing 
severe economic difficulties.” Q11C: “In times of crisis, [COUNTRY] should give financial help to other 
countries outside of the European Union facing severe economic difficulties.” 
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in financial crisis: A huge majority of 83 % of respondents want to give financial help to suf-
fering regions within their own country. 
We have argued that it does not suffice if the majority of all Europeans support the idea of 
European solidarity. Instead, the majority in each individual Member State has to be in favour 
of the idea of solidarity as well. But how homogenous are attitudes of citizens across different 
EU countries toward European fiscal solidarity? As Figure 2.2 shows, the majority of citizens 
in all 13 surveyed countries were in favour of European solidarity. With this observation, the 
double majority criterion for the existence of European solidarity is fulfilled: Not only does the 
majority of all citizens across the EU support aid for crisis countries in the EU, but also the 
majority of people in each individual country. 
Figure 2.1 Approval for bailouts in times of crisis by different spatial levels (relative 
frequencies) 
 
Source: TESS 2016, own calculations, N = 11,927, relative frequencies, only valid answers, weighted. 
 
100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
to other countries
outside the EU
to other EU
countries
to regions within
the own country
totally disagree tend to disagree tend to agree totally agree
t ir i it i
t i  
toiotheriEU
countries
toiother countries
outsideith i U
12 
Conclusion: The EU and the IMF established European bailout funds, such as the permanent 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), to grant loans to Eurozone countries facing the most 
serious financial difficulties. While these measures have not gone unchallenged in Europe, the 
TESS survey findings point to great willingness to show fiscal solidarity. Two thirds of citizens 
in the countries we investigated agree with fiscal solidarity, and in general the majority did not 
reject it in any of these 13 countries. Hence, the double majority criterion of the existence of a 
European Solidarity is fulfilled. At the same time, citizens’ willingness to help European crisis 
countries is admittedly lower than for regions within their own nation state. This level of will-
ingness, however, is significantly higher than for countries that are not part of the EU. Thus, 
Europe undoubtedly constitutes a distinct space of solidarity.   
Figure 2.2 Approval for bailouts of other EU countries by country (relative frequencies) 
 
Source: TESS 2016, own calculations, N = 11,927, relative frequencies, only valid answers, weighted. 
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3 European Welfare State Solidarity 
EU Member States experienced severe cutbacks in economic growth rates and rising unem-
ployment rates due to the Great Recession (Jenkins et al. 2013; Heidenreich 2016). However, 
the extent of the crisis differed between countries. In particular, the southern European countries 
experienced higher unemployment rates than western European economies (i.e., the creditors 
of the Eurozone crisis), who bounced back from the crisis faster and were able to stabilise un-
employment rates more successfully. In addition, some measures for combating the sovereign 
debt crises in southern EU Member States have intensified the economic crisis and the arising 
social problems once again. The EU Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) forced debtor countries to carry out sweeping reforms to 
their state budgets and economic structures. Although these so-called austerity measures tar-
geted to reduce countries’ debts, and to spark a period of economic growth in the long-term, 
they have worsened the situation for the most vulnerable people in crisis countries in the short-
term. In light of these social problems, it is not surprising that in some Member States the de-
mand for European welfare policies has increased. These requests mostly come from the in-
debted crisis countries’ own governments and citizens, but also from left wing parties from the 
wealthier countries. The urge for a European social policy had already been expressed long 
before the Great Recession, though it certainly obtained a newfound virulence and articulation 
from it. 
Against the backdrop of the Great Recession in 2008, this chapter focuses on two subdimen-
sions of European welfare state solidarity: (1) attitudes toward an EU-wide social security, (2) 
attitudes toward reducing inequalities between rich and poor Europeans. 
3.1 Attitudes toward European Social Security 
In this section, we investigate whether respondents agree that all EU citizens should be entitled 
to the same level of social security, regardless of in which Member State they live. We tested 
to what degree respondents think the European Union should be responsible for guaranteeing 
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social security to the following vulnerable groups: (1) the sick, (2) the elderly, (3) and the un-
employed. These social groups are typical recipients of welfare state support and encompass 
individuals who are in need.6 
Figure 3.1 depicts the distribution of answers aggregated across the 13 surveyed countries. In 
general, an overwhelming majority of respondents believe that the European Union should be 
responsible for the well-being of individuals from three mentioned social groups, irrespective 
of the reason for their vulnerability. Not only that, but a large percentage of respondents gave 
their full consent (by answering “fully agree”) to the notion of ensuring social security for all 
Europeans in all three items. Focusing on the differences between the three vulnerable groups, 
                                            
6  Wording of question text (Q02): “Now please don’t think about [COUNTRY], but about the European Union 
in Brussels and its responsibilities. Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you totally 
agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree.” Q02A: “The European Union should guarantee access 
to health care for everyone in the EU.” Q02B: “The European Union should guarantee a decent standard of 
living for the elderly in the EU.” Q02C: “The European Union should guarantee a decent standard of living for 
the unemployed in the EU.” 
Figure 3.1 Approval for social security nationwide and in the EU (relative frequencies) 
 
Source: TESS 2016, own calculations, N = 12,015, relative frequencies with only valid cases, weighted. 
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there are minor variations between the responses. 90 % of respondents agree that the European 
Union should be responsible for sick and elderly Europeans. In contrast, 77 % of respondents 
support the notion that the European Union needs to secure the standard of living of all unem-
ployed Europeans. Despite the lower level of agreement, the latter rate still exceeds two-thirds 
majority. Thus, attitudes toward the three vulnerable groups meet the first criterion for the ex-
istence of European welfare state solidarity. 
We further investigate how the national and the European level of solidarity relate to each 
other.7 In contrast to the other domains of solidarity, we did not measure the extent of welfare 
solidarity on the global level. Welfare solidarity needs a collective actor, such as the nation state 
or the EU, which distributes resources to vulnerable groups. Such an actor does not exist at the 
global level. Therefore, we have refrained from measuring solidarity on the global level in order 
to avoid unreliable answers. 
When comparing the differences in attitudes toward national and European social security, we 
observe only marginally higher rates of agreement for the national level. 94 % of individuals 
support the idea that national governments should guarantee sick people health care and 98 % 
of individuals agree that national governments should guarantee the elderly decent living cir-
cumstances. On the other hand, only 82 % of respondents want national governments to guar-
antee the unemployed a decent standard of living. This highlights two considerations. First, the 
national level serves as a reference to attitudes on the European level. Second, the two territorial 
levels do not differ from each other. Hence, Europe seems to be a similar space of solidarity as 
the nation state. 
Figure 3.2 depicts that country differences show only minor variations. The majority of citizens 
in the 13 surveyed countries overwhelmingly are in favour of European welfare solidarity 
meaning that another criterion of the existence of a European solidarity is met. It is noteworthy 
that citizens from crisis-ridden Mediterranean countries facing high unemployment rates in the 
aftermath of the crisis show the highest approval rates for European social security. This is 
especially true for helping the unemployed. Since the welfare state is under the most pressure 
in these countries and unemployment rates are the highest, we can assume that these citizens 
would want the EU to solve their welfare issues, as their own national welfare state cannot cope 
                                            
7  Wording of question (Q01): “People have different views on what the [NATIONAL] government should be 
responsible for. Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you totally agree, tend to agree, 
tend to disagree or totally disagree.” Q01A: “The [NATIONAL] government should guarantee access to health 
care for everyone in [COUNTRY].” Q01B: “The [NATIONAL] government should guarantee a decent stand-
ard of living for the elderly in [COUNTRY].” Q01C: “The [NATIONAL] government should guarantee a 
decent standard of living for the unemployed in [COUNTRY].” 
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with it. In contrast, in Austria, Poland, Sweden, and Germany, where unemployment has been 
low, citizens exhibit significantly less agreement with European social security than in the first 
group of countries (although the approval rates in these countries are still rather high). 
3.2 Attitudes toward European Income Redistribution between Poor and Rich People 
The second subdimension of welfare state solidarity focuses on the redistributive goal of wel-
fare states. In this section, we investigated to what extent respondents think that income ine-
qualities between rich and poor Europeans should be reduced.8 Figure 3.3 shows that the ma-
jority of EU citizens exhibit a strong positive preference for the reduction of income inequality 
between the rich and the poor people at the European level. More than three quarters of re-
spondents agree that the European Union should be responsible for the reduction of inequalities. 
This rate is just slightly lower than that for redistribution at the national level. This indicates 
that people accept Europe as a space of solidarity. 
                                            
8  Wording of question (Q01D): “The [NATIONAL] government should reduce income differences between the 
rich and poor in [COUNTRY].” Question text (Q02D): “The European Union should reduce income differ-
ences between the rich and poor in the EU.” 
Figure 3.2 Approval for helping people in need in other EU countries by country (relative 
frequencies) 
 
Source: TESS 2016, own calculations, N = 12,015, relative frequencies, only valid answers, weighted. 
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Looking at the country differences (Figure 3.4), we see that the majority in all countries support 
the idea that the EU should reduce inequality. Approval rates are highest in crisis-ridden coun-
tries. For example, in Cyprus more than 90 % of the citizens support the idea that the EU should 
reduce the differences between rich and poor people. In contrast, wealthier countries are placed 
in the row of countries with the lowest approval rates for European redistribution. For example, 
Swedish respondents exhibit the lowest approval rates (64 %). 
Conclusion: In the course of the financial crisis, the Great Recession hit EU economies. Along 
with the austerity measures, the risk of not being able to reach decent standard of living ampli-
fied especially for the most vulnerable in southern European economies. Against this backdrop, 
our findings show that an overwhelming majority of European citizens supports the idea of a 
European welfare state solidarity. The approval rates for national and European welfare state 
solidarity differ only slightly. Unsurprisingly, we found the highest approval in the crisis-ridden 
countries for European welfare state solidarity. Overall, the citizens of all surveyed countries 
show a high level of welfare state solidarity, on which future European social policies can build 
on. 
Figure 3.3 Attitudes toward redistribution between rich and poor people nationwide and in 
the EU (relative frequencies) 
 
Source: TESS 2016, own calculations, N = 12,174, relative frequencies with only valid cases, weighted. 
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Figure 3.4 Support for redistribution between rich and poor people by country (relative 
frequencies) 
 
Source: TESS 2016, own calculations, N = 12,015, relative frequencies with only valid cases, weighted. 
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4 European Territorial Solidarity 
With the accession of twelve new Member States in 2004 and 2007, the European Union faced 
a huge increase in welfare disparities: In all new Member States the gross domestic product was 
far below the EU average (Eurostat 2017). Nevertheless, the new Member States experienced 
an increase in economic growth rates in the following years both in absolute and relative terms 
(Eurostat 2017). It seemed as if the economic convergence process, one of the central goals of 
the European Union (European Union 2012a: Article 3 (3); European Union 2012b: Article 
174), was well on its way. The situation changed with the economic and Eurozone crises start-
ing in 2008. Although at a slower rate than before, the new Member States, especially in eastern 
Europe, were able to further reduce their distance from wealthier states. Despite this, a new 
cleavage arose when the countries hit hardest by the crisis in southern Europe fell behind in 
economic terms. Until today, Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Cyprus have barely been able to 
recover the economic position that they held within Europe’s economic structure before 2008 
(Eurostat 2017). 
With the north-south divide reinforcing itself, spatial disparities seem to be one of the biggest 
challenges to the EU today. Whilst measures to tackle spatial disparities have existed within the 
European Union for several decades. They are limited in two ways. First, although they take up 
a big part of the overall EU-budget, they are restricted in their financial scope. Second, with the 
exception of funds like the European Solidarity Fund (ESF), established for providing financial 
help to countries in the event of natural disasters, such measures aim at enhancing the situation 
of subnational regions particularly by supporting projects in certain thematic fields. This chap-
ter aims to describe citizens’ attitudes toward the reduction of spatial disparities, the domain of 
solidarity coined territorial solidarity. 
Within the TESS, we surveyed citizens’ general attitudes toward the reduction of territorial 
disparities. According to our concept of solidarity, we measured attitudes toward territorial sol-
idarity on three spatial levels: solidarity between regions within own nation state, between coun-
tries within the EU, and solidarity with countries outside of the EU.9 
                                            
9  Wording of question (Q17): “There are differences between rich and poor regions in a country, between coun-
tries in Europe, and also between countries in the world. Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree 
with the following statements.” Q17A: “Differences between rich and poor [GENERALREGIONNAME]s in 
[COUNTRY] should be reduced, even if wealthier [GENERALREGIONNAME]s have to pay more.” Q17B: 
“Differences between rich and poor countries in the EU should be reduced, even if wealthier countries in the 
European Union have to pay more.” Q17C: “Differences between EU countries and poor countries outside of 
the EU should be reduced, even if EU countries have to pay more.” 
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Figure 4.1 shows that more than two thirds of the respondents favour the reduction of spatial 
differences among EU countries. Support for solidarity between different regions of a nation 
state is only slightly bigger. For a global reduction of wealth inequality, we find only a slight 
majority support. Thus, this indicates that Europe constitutes distinct space of solidarity for this 
domain as well. 
Figure 4.2 depicts that a majority of respondents speak out for the reduction of disparities 
among the EU states in each surveyed country. This indicates that the double majority criterion 
for the existence of a European solidarity is fulfilled. Nevertheless, country differences are ra-
ther high, and homogenous clusters can be observed. In southern and eastern Member States, 
the idea of reducing disparities within the EU is highly approved. In contrast, western and 
northern European countries show the lowest rates of acceptance, ranging from Austria (66 %) 
to the Netherlands (53%). Here Ireland, a crisis-stricken country, forms an exception with an 
acceptance rate above the average (76%). Thus, it seems that a country’s economic and finan-
cial potential influences the degree its citizens supporting territorial solidarity. 
Figure 4.1 Approval for reduction of spatial differences by different spatial levels (relative 
frequencies) 
 
Source: TESS 2016, own calculations, N = 11,843, relative frequencies, only valid answers, weighted. 
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Conclusion: While economic disparities between eastern and western European countries are 
slowly decreasing, a new north-south divide is rising in the aftermath of the economic crisis. In 
this chapter, we presented findings on the question of whether people are willing to reduce 
wealth disparities between spatial units (territorial solidarity), focussing particularly on the 
reduction of wealth between EU Member States. Our results show that a great majority of EU 
citizens agree on reducing disparities among countries within the EU. This majority exists in 
every country surveyed, even though levels of agreement vary highly, with higher levels of 
approval in southern and lower approval rates in northern and western European countries. Fur-
thermore, the results imply that nation state are still the most important territorial space for 
reducing disparities, while the EU comes second before the global level. As a consequence, 
further integration steps, like expanding the already established measures of redistribution (e.g. 
regional funds), could be accepted by the EU citizens and may help to improve the convergence 
process within the Union. 
Figure 4.2 Approval for reduction of spatial differences between EU countries by country 
(relative frequencies) 
 
Source: TESS 2016, own calculations, N = 11,843, relative frequencies, only valid answers, weighted. 
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5 Refugee Solidarity 
In recent years, various global crises such as war, famine, and poverty have quadrupled the 
number of refugees coming to Europe to over one million per year. This considerable increase 
in the number of asylum seekers created an administrative meltdown in several European coun-
tries and a breakdown of the European asylum registration system as a whole, hence bringing 
about the so-called European refugee crisis. This crisis is noted as starting in the summer of 
2015, when Greece became completely incapable of registering all incoming refugees. Forced 
to seek asylum elsewhere, refugees made a trail along the so-called Balkan route, resulting in 
the temporary suspension of the Dublin rules in Europe. 
The rationale to prevent as much unregulated influx of refugees as possible dominated most 
European governments’ attempts to cope with the situation. Hungary closed its European bor-
ders to refugees. The EU signed a treaty with Turkey obliging the country to take back any 
refugees who illegally cross the border between Turkey and Europe. In return, the EU agreed 
to accept asylum seekers directly from Turkish refugee camps. 
Moreover, the Commission and the European Council (EC) tried to tackle the asymmetric dis-
tribution of incoming refugees among the Member States. In retaliation, the Council voted for 
a quota system, which meant to resettle more than 120,000 refugees from Greece and Italy to 
countries that were not accommodating as many refugees. However, the Member States could 
not find common ground on this issue, so the EC had to implement the quota only on the back 
of a qualifying majority against the votes of the Visegrád group. Another drawback on this issue 
has been the slow implementation of the refugee quota. Many countries are expected to miss 
their target for the numbers of resettled refugees. 
Against this backdrop of a European migration crisis, we explore two different solidarities at 
play: (1) external solidarity, which is the Europeans’ solidarity with refugees themselves, and 
(2) solidarity among the EU countries, support to balancing the unequal costs for accommodat-
ing arriving refugees. In the TESS, we addressed both aspects of solidarity and operationalised 
them differently. 
5.1 EU Citizens’ Support for Refugees’ Right to Stay 
In order to measure the extent of solidarity with incoming refugees, we asked respondents 
whether refugees should have the right to stay in Europe. As there are different reasons and 
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motives for why refugees want to come and stay in Europe, we distinguish between different 
groups of refugees.10 Five of the seven items operationalise the attitude toward a refugee whose 
reason for fleeing makes them eligible for asylum or subsidiary protection in Europe based on 
the Geneva Convention and relevant qualification directive. The causes for seeking asylum are 
(1) persecution because of campaigning for human rights, (2) one’s religious denomination, (3) 
suffering from war, and (4) persecution relating to one’s sexual orientation. Applying the crite-
rion of Europe as a specific solidarity space that is distinguishable from the national and global 
level does not make sense in the case of refugee solidarity as refugees are people who come 
from outside of Europe. Therefore, in this section we will solely analyse whether the majority 
criterion is fulfilled. 
As Figure 5.1 shows, at least two thirds of all respondents approve justifications that are in line 
with European asylum legislation. Nonetheless, there are significant differences between the 
levels of acceptance regarding refugee’s different hypothetical reasons for abandonment. Peo-
ple who campaigned for human rights (89 %), belong to a Christian minority (83 %), or suffer 
from war (90 %), are accepted as refugees more generously. The acceptance rate slightly de-
creases for Muslims (68 %) and refugees persecuted because of their sexual orientation (76 %). 
                                            
10  Wording of question (Q09): “People have different reasons for coming to the European Union. Please tell me 
to what extent you agree or disagree with granting the right to stay for people who…” Q09A: “… are persecuted 
because they campaign for human rights.” Q09B: “… are persecuted because they belong to a Christian mi-
nority.” Q09C: “… suffer from a war.” Q09D: “… are persecuted because they are homosexuals.” Q09E: “… 
are persecuted because they belong to a Muslim minority.” Q09F: “… hold occupational skills [COUNTRY] 
needs.” Q09G: “…believe they will have better life prospects in Europe.” 
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Figure 5.2 displays country variation in the approval rates. What rings true for every country is 
that at least two thirds of respondents would approve the right to stay for refugees suffering 
from war. Yet, there are still notable differences between EU Member States. The highest ap-
proval rates can be found in Germany, Sweden, and Spain, whereas Cyprus, Slovakia, and Hun-
gary make up the lower end of the table. 
Turning to the approval rates of refugees who are persecuted because of belonging to a Muslim 
community, we can observe similar differences. Yet, in several countries there is no majority 
in favour of Muslim refugees’ right to stay, even though the Geneva Convention grants these 
rights unconditionally. These countries are Cyprus (46 %), and the Visegrád countries included 
in our survey: Poland (47 %), Slovakia (41 %), and Hungary (36 %). Thus, the double majority 
criterion is not fulfilled for all groups of asylum seekers in all countries of the EU. 
  
Figure 5.1 Approval for accepting refugees in Europe by different reasons for seeking 
refuge (relative frequencies) 
 
Source: TESS 2016, own calculations, N = 11,296, relative frequencies, only valid answers, weighted. 
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5.2 Europeans’ Willingness to Share the Burden in the Migrant Crisis 
The refugee crisis has opened up a second question in relation to the concept of European soli-
darity: To what extent the Europeans support the idea that refugees should be fairly distributed 
among the Member States of the EU? To explore its nature, we designed two alternative distri-
bution mechanisms that would go beyond the existing Dublin rules and have been intensively 
debated by the Member States:11 (1) Every EU Member State should accommodate refugees 
and (2) Member States who do not accommodate refugees should pay compensation to those 
that take them. As the answers to these two items are highly correlated, we will discuss results 
concerning the first item only. 
The approval rates indicate a solid majority for redistributing refugees among all Member States 
across the 13 surveyed countries, as Figure 5.3 shows. Thus, the first part of the double majority 
criterion is met. However, the rate of citizens approving redistribution measures within each 
                                            
11  Wording of question (Q08): “Recently, many refugees came to the European Union. I will now read out to you 
some statements about how the EU countries could tackle the refugee problem together. Please tell me to what 
extent you agree or disagree with the following statements.” Q08A: “Each EU country should be required to 
accommodate refugees.” Q08B: “If an EU country does not want to let refugees in, it has to pay compensation 
to other countries that take them.” 
Figure 5.2 Approval for accepting refugees that suffer from war or are of muslim 
denomination: country differences (relative frequencies) 
 
Source: TESS 2016, own calculations, N = 11,296, relative frequencies, only valid answers, weighted. 
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country does not meet the 50 per cent threshold, as indicated by Figure 5.4. Thus, the second 
aspect of the double majority criterion is not fulfilled here. 
The Visegrád countries (i.e., Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary) strongly disagree with the notion 
that each EU country should be required to accommodate refugees. The question of national 
identity and self-determination is of very high salience in these countries. So we hypothesis that 
this can stand in the background of attitudes. The inflow of foreigners is perceived as an affront 
to their culturally defined national identities, and any redistribution of refugees across the EU 
is rejected on account of it being an incursion into national sovereignty. Thus, in the case of 
internal solidarity (sharing the burden between the Member States) the second part of the double 
majority criterion is not fulfilled. 
Conclusion: The sharp increase in the number of refugees coming to Europe has raised two 
central questions of solidarity: (1) Are Europeans willing to grant asylum seeking refugees the 
right to stay, and (2) are Europeans willing to share the costs of accommodation and integration 
among each other. For the first aspect of refugee solidarity, our findings show that a majority 
of Europeans are willing to grant refugees the right to stay in Europe. However, this does not 
hold true for all the reasons for seeking asylum in all countries. In particular, in four of our 13 
survey countries a majority of respondents reject the right to stay in Europe to people who had 
to flee because of their Muslim denomination, even though the Geneva Convention covers this 
right. These countries are Cyprus, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary. 
Figure 5.3 Approval for redistributing refugees among all Member States (relative 
frequencies) 
 
Source: TESS 2016, own calculations, N = 11,789, relative frequencies, only valid answers, weighted. 
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It also becomes apparent that the disapproval of refugee solidarity is strongest in the Visegrád 
countries regarding the second aspect of refugee solidarity: the burden sharing. Although the 
overall approval rate for a redistribution mechanism reaches a two third majority, the majority 
of respondents from Poland, Slovakia and Hungary strongly oppose the idea of redistributing 
refugees between the EU Member States. Hence, the double majority criterion for a European 
solidarity is not fulfilled. 
Figure 5.4 Approval for redistributing refugees among all Member States: country 
differences (relative frequencies) 
 
Source: TESS 2016, own calculations, N = 11,789, relative frequencies, only valid answers, weighted. 
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6 Summary of Findings 
The question whether a solidarity between citizens of the European Union and among Member 
States exists became a virulent topic against the backdrop of the several crises’ that hit the EU 
in the last ten years. We have distinguished between four domains of European solidarity, each 
of them relating to one of the European crises: (1) fiscal solidarity, (2) welfare state solidarity, 
(3) territorial solidarity, and (4) refugee solidarity. 
In addition, we have defined four theoretically derived criteria to measure the strength of Euro-
pean solidarity. European solidarity exists when the following criteria are met: (1) The majority 
of all Europeans and a majority in each European country supports the idea of European soli-
darity. (2) Europe constitutes a space of solidarity distinguishable from both global and national 
solidarity. (3) EU citizens are prepared to sacrifice resources in defense of European solidarity. 
(4) Social and political cleavages between supporters and opponents of European solidarity are 
not pronounced. 
For each of the four domains of solidarity we examined whether or not the four criteria are met 
by means of a survey conducted in 13 EU Members States in 2016. This report has focused on 
the first two criteria only and presented only some basic descriptive results. A forthcoming book 
will present the analyses of all criteria for all domains of solidarity with more sophisticated 
analytical tools. 
For fiscal solidarity, the results show that two thirds of the respondents are willing to give 
emergency aid to EU crisis countries. Even if differences in levels of approval between the 13 
countries are apparent, we find a majority in favour of European fiscal solidarity in all countries. 
Furthermore, European solidarity prevails somewhat less than the support for crisis regions 
within one’s own nation state, but considerably more than the support for crisis countries that 
are not part of the EU. Thus, the first two criteria for European fiscal solidarity are fulfilled. 
Regarding welfare state solidarity, we found that at least two thirds of the respondents approve 
the support of people at risk (unemployed, elderly, or sick) and endorse the redistribution of 
wealth between rich and poor people across the EU. Differences in approval rates per country 
are rather small. Although national welfare state institutions remain the first choice of our re-
spondents, differences between the two territorial spaces are negligible. 
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Most EU citizens also support the idea of European territorial solidarity, i.e., the reduction of 
wealth differences between EU countries. More than 70 % of respondents are in favour of re-
ducing spatial differences between EU Member States. While support is slightly smaller in 
comparison to equalisation measures within the nation states, a global redistribution scheme 
would barely find a majority support. Again, the first two criteria are fulfilled for territorial 
solidarity. 
Regarding refugee solidarity, our analysis reveals a more complex and differentiated picture. 
We find strong differences between countries although the overall approval rate for accepting 
refugees in Europe reaches a two-thirds majority in the whole sample. The majority of citizens 
in Cyprus, and in the Visegrád countries (Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary), are not willing to 
grant refugees the right to stay in Europe if they were persecuted because of their Muslim de-
nomination. A similar picture emerges in the analysis of attitudes regarding internal solidarity. 
Whilst citizens in all western and southern European countries support the idea that refugees 
should be distributed equally between the Member States, three quarters of Polish, Hungarian, 
and Slovakian citizens reject this suggestion. Of all the crises that the European Union faces, 
the refugee crisis challenges European solidarity the most. 
Overall, our analyses of a survey conducted in 13 EU countries exposes quite surprising find-
ings. European citizens altogether display a notably higher level of solidarity with citizens of 
other EU countries than many politicians and social scientists have presumed so far. This espe-
cially applies for the support of people in need (welfare state solidarity) and the reduction of 
wealth inequalities between rich and poor European countries (territorial solidarity), but also to 
the domain of fiscal solidarity. Furthermore, European solidarity turns out to be stronger than 
the global one. However, this optimistic view does not apply for the domain of refugee solidar-
ity. Whilst citizens of western and southern European countries support both the acceptance of 
refugees and the fair distribution of the incurring costs and burdens between European coun-
tries, only a minority of people in eastern European countries share this point of view. 
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Appendix: TESS Research Design 
The Transnational European Solidarity Survey (TESS) is a unique survey. It was conducted as 
a joint venture of two research teams from projects “SOLIDUS” (EU/Horizon 2020) and “Hor-
izontal Europeanization” (DFG). The polling institute TNS infratest dimap Berlin and national 
subsidies from TNS Opinion and Social carried out the fieldwork in 13 European countries. 
The 12,500 interviews in the TESS survey were recorded between May and November 2016. 
Unfortunately, polling in 13 EU countries does not allow us to survey a comprehensive picture 
of the European Union as a whole. Nevertheless, we aimed to have a broad spectrum of coun-
tries in our survey. This allowed us to explore the domains of solidarity as deep as possible. We 
took into account the following criteria for country selection: 
(1) Did a country receive financial help from an international fund or facility during the 
Eurozone crisis? 
(2) Is the country part of the Eurozone? 
(3) What kind of regime does the country’s welfare state belong to (liberal, social demo-
cratic, conservative, Mediterranean, post-socialist)? 
(4) Does the country presently have a rather eurosceptic or non-eurosceptic government? 
We aimed to sample a diverse set of countries containing a balanced number of states on both 
aspects of each criterion. Therefore, we selected Greece, Cyprus, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland 
as receivers of international funds and facilities due to the Eurozone and sovereign debt crises 
in our final sample. Sweden represents a social democratic welfare state regime as the only 
Scandinavian country in our sample. France, the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria are all part 
of the Eurozone. Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary represent younger EU Member States as well 
as central and eastern European countries. By selecting Poland and Hungary, we covered two 
non-Eurozone members as well. Figure A.1 displays our final country selection. 
The two research teams jointly developed the master questionnaire. Subsequently, the master 
version was translated into the country languages by a professional translation office familiar 
with survey field research and was then counter-checked by a second translation company. Na-
tive speakers affiliated with the research teams finally checked each national questionnaire. 
These national splits have been adjusted for country specifics (e.g., country names and curren-
cies mentioned in the survey text) and then pre-tested on a sample of 50 respondents per coun-
try. Before the fielding of the final questionnaire we made some minor adjustments based on 
the pre-test. 
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In order to acquire reliable data representative of each country’s population, we considered two 
major constraints for the sampling. First, the various national landline/mobile phone mix of the 
gross sample was taken into account as a remarkable proportion of households do not have a 
landline phone these days. Therefore, CATI surveys that only rely on landline sampling are 
facing selective coverage problems. Infratest dimap Berlin is one of the leading institutes rely-
ing on current standard proportions used in Eurobarometer Flash surveys with varying land-
line/mobile phone quotas per country. For example, it is sufficient to conduct 10 % of all inter-
views via mobile connections in Germany, whereas this same proportion is 50 % in Poland. 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table A.1 list further details on country specific information on the landline 
coverage in our sample. 
Second, to cover all regions of each country proportionally to the number of inhabitants, the 
numbers in the gross sample were stratified regionally by using the NUTS II regions. The gross 
sample was allocated to cells representing the NUTS II regions according to their share in the 
population. Within each cell, the dialled numbers were selected at random. Furthermore, only 
nationals eligible to vote in the national parliament elections in the respective country could 
Figure A.1 The 13 TESS countries 
 
Source: Own depiction. 
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take part in the TESS. In landline households with multiple members, the interview partner has 
been identified using the last birthday method. 
Infratest dimap Berlin calculated two weighted variables, PFAKT and GESFAKT. These take 
into account the research design and compensate for the oversampling of certain regions and 
groups of people in particular social strata. PFAKT is applied when one is interested in national 
statistics and figures. GESFAKT weights the data in order to gain representative information 
for all of the thirteen TESS countries. 
The fieldwork was coordinated by TNS Brussels, who is also responsible for coordinating the 
Eurobarometer surveys. In each survey country, we targeted the completion of 1,000 inter-
views, except for Cyprus (here, 500 interviews were sufficient due to its scarce population). In 
eleven out of the 13 countries, the fieldwork was conducted in June and July 2016. In France 
and Ireland, the fieldwork phase was set for October and November 2016. Column 1 of Table 
A.1 shows the detailed fieldwork periods for each country. 
The average length of interviews ranges from 23 minutes in Cyprus to 32 minutes in Sweden. 
Given the fact that there were no differences between countries related to filtering or questions, 
the difference in length results from differences in local languages. Column 5 of Table A.1 
documents the detailed interview length in each country. 
Overall, net response rates (the share of completed interviews compared to interview attempts 
with eligible interviewees) ranged from 1.3 % in Austria to 9.5 % in Hungary (country details 
in column 6 of Table A.1).
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Table A.1 Country specific fieldwork information 
Country 
Fieldwork period 
2016 
Landline 
(in percent) 
Mobile 
(in percent) 
Number of  
net interviews 
Average interview 
length 
Response rate 
(in percent) 
Austria June 6 to July 6 49 51 n=1,010 30 min 1.3 
Republic of Cy-
prus 
June 7 to June 22 90 10 n=500 23 min 2.7 
France Oct 10 to Nov 5 90 10 n=1,002 27 min 5.3 
Germany June 6 to July 1 90 10 n=1,001 28 min 3.0 
Greece June 9 to July 1 80 20 n=1,000 24 min 5.1 
Hungary June 6 to June 30 52 48 n=1,001 29 min 9.5 
Ireland Oct 10 to Nov 14 70 30 n=1,000 25 min 2.6 
The Netherlands June 6 to July 5 90 10 n=1,000 29 min 5.5 
Poland June 6 to July 1 50 50 n=1,000 27 min 4.4 
Portugal June 6 to July 1 70 30 n=1,000 27 min 7.7 
Slovakia June 6 to July 5 30 70 n=1,000 29 min 7.6 
Spain June 6 to July 6 70 30 n=1,001 26 min 2.3 
Sweden June 7 to July 13 60 40 n=1,000 32 min 6.1 
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